War in Ukraine: The Failure of the Liberal Rules Based World Order

Introduction

The war in Ukraine has been raging on for over three years since its start in February 2022. Before it started it was unthinkable, especially in the Western countries that a permanent member of a UN Security Council would openly invade another sovereign nation. As of writing this essay, the war has at least one million casualties (Pancevski 2024), Ukrainian cities are under daily bombardment, and the war also spilled over to Russia, with Ukrainian troops taking parts of Russian territory (BBC 2024). This war, especially its start, brings into question several principles of the Liberal Rules Based World Order which have been the core principles of international law and global governance since the end of the Second World War. In this paper, by applying Barnett and Finnemore’s (1999) framework, I will examine why the international community, particularly the West, has been unable to act in a way that would fit such a violation of international law and treaties.

Liberal Rules Based World Order

Liberal Rules Based World Order summarized

The Liberal Rules Based World Order (LRBWO), established after World War II, can be described as a framework of principles and practices designed to maintain global stability and promote prosperity (Ikenberry 2018: 11). Key principles of this order include: 1) the openness of trade and movement, which fosters greater interconnectedness, economic cooperation, and technological exchange, thereby reducing the likelihood of conflict (Duncombe and Dunne 2018: 28; Ikenberry 2018: 11; Jahn 2018: 45); 2) a set of rules and institutions, such as the United Nations, Geneva Convention, World Trade Organization, and International Monetary Fund, that promote and regulate this openness (Ikenberry 2018: 11; Jahn 2018: 45); 3) the principle of sovereignty and respect for territorial integrity, ensuring states are safeguarded from external aggression and free to govern their internal affairs (Jahn 2018: 47); 4) a commitment to multilateralism, where countries collaborate through international institutions to resolve disputes and coordinate policy, (Duncombe and Dunne 2018: 26-28; Ikenberry 2018: 11; Jahn 2018: 50-51); and 5) the promotion of democratic principles and human rights, which are viewed as essential for maintaining global peace (Jahn 2018: 45). The core treaties that established the LRBWO are the UN Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Geneva Convention, GATT/WTO Agreements, Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of nuclear weapons, and Bretton Woods Agreements, which together established the set of rules, principles, laws, and institutions forming the legal and institutional framework for managing global affairs (Ikenberry 2018).

The main promoters of this order have been the United States, together with the countries of Western Europe formed in the EU, and former Axis powers of Japan, Italy, and Germany. Throughout the 20th century, former Communist countries, namely China and Russia, also became integrated into the LRBWO, which some referred to as the ‘end of history’ and the inevitable triumph of liberal democracy (Fukuyama 1992; Jahn 2018: 58). Furthermore, the founding countries showed severe commitment to defend the LBRWO and its principles, such as during the Cold War Containment of the USSR through the formation of NATO as a deterrent force, during the Gulf War in 1991, during the intervention in the Balkans in the 1990s, after 9/11 by invading Afghanistan in 2001 or the intervention in Libya in 2011 (Western and Goldstein 2011).

Liberal Rules Based World Order and Ukraine

Concerning Ukraine, the LRBWO was supposed to protect Ukraine mainly through the principle of sovereignty embedded in the UN Charter, which was meant to protect Ukraine from external aggression, particularly following its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. This principle states that nations have the right to self-determination within their respective borders (UN Charter 1945). The international community, the Western powers, and Russia recognized Ukrainian independence when the USSR dissolved, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established in 1991 (Ruland 2023: 1). Additionally, the UN Charter’s Chapter VII outlines mechanisms for collective action against aggressors, theoretically allowing the international community to respond to breaches of peace (UN Charter 1945).

The sovereignty of Ukraine was further strengthened by the Budapest Memorandum in 1994. In this memorandum, Ukraine, an heir to a part of the USSR’s nuclear arsenal, gave this arsenal back to Russia, accessing the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a ‘non-nuclear weapon state’, in exchange for non-binding security assurances from the US, the UK, and Russia (Kimball 2020). These assurances were intended to protect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, yet they lacked an enforcement mechanism.

Red Lines crossed by Russia

By invading Ukraine, partially in 2014 and openly in 2022, Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, severely challenged the LRBWO and its founding treaties, treaties that Russia signed. According to the ‘Concept of Foreign Policy of Russian Federation’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2023), Russia is still upholding these treaties and intends to do so, which brings into question the credibility of these treaties, since Russia is cleverly bending the interpretation of the UN Charter or the Declaration of Human Rights.

The most crucial violation of the LRBWO rules and principles is the violation of the UN Charter. The right to self-determination by nations is embedded in the UN Charter Article 1(2) (UN Charter 1945). The Russian government repeatedly denies the existence of the Ukrainian nation, its language, and its culture, which leads to the justification of the invasion (Azarov et al. 2023). This can be interpreted as a crime of genocide under the ICC Statute (ibid.). It is even more puzzling since, as stated above, Ukraine has been an internationally recognized nation by all members of the UN, including Russia, since 1991 (Ruland 2023: 1). Furthermore, the invasion of another sovereign state is also in violation of the UN Charter’s Article 2 (UN Charter 1945). Finally, conducting referendums in the presence of the Russian military in the captured territories is another example of a violation of the UN Charter Article 2(4) (ibid.).

Second, Russia also violated the Budapest Memorandum, which is closely tied to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). According to the Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine, by then a recognized state, connecting to the first point again, agreed to give up its nuclear arsenal (Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1994). Russia, in exchange, agreed to 1) respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; 2) refrain from the use of force against Ukraine; 3) avoid economic coercion against Ukraine (ibid.). By invading Ukraine Russia violated and directly opposed its previous commitments to not invade it.

The third point closely ties to the Budapest Memorandum, since by violating it Russia also violated the NPT. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia has repeatedly used nuclear threats as a coercive mechanism towards Ukraine and especially NATO (de Dreuzy and Gilli 2022). By doing so Russia violates Article 6 of the NPT, which states that nuclear states should work toward disarmament and the reduction of nuclear risk (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968). Furthermore, by using such threats, Russia undermines the security assurances that the NPT aims to uphold, concretely the commitment of nuclear-weapons sates not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states (ibid.). Finally, Russia also withdrew from the New START treaty signed between Russia and the US, which is designed to limit the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems, enhancing transparency and predictability between the two largest nuclear powers (Reuters 2023).

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is one of the biggest challenges to the LRBWO, its founding treaties, and the interpretation of international law. It is maybe THE biggest challenge since the end of the Cold War since it’s so open and direct (de Dreuzy and Gilli 2022). Russia is selectively applying international law since it states that it is still adhering to the UN principles (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation 2023), yet its actions are often the opposite. Yet the Western countries, the supposed defenders of this order, seem to be unable, ill-equipped, or unwilling to respond in a way that would fit such a big violation of these core principles and treaties. In the next section, I will shed light on why that might be the case.

The Failure of Liberal Rules Based World Order

UN’s structural constraints

One of the key points Bennet and Finnemore (1999) make about IOs is that they are often constrained by their own rules and frameworks, as well as the power structures that underpin them. These structural limitations can lead to the dysfunction of IOs (ibid.). In the case of the United Nations, the Security Council, which is the most important body of the organization, is often paralyzed by the veto power of its permanent members (P5), including Russia and the US.

Russia’s veto power in the UN Security Council blocked all three attempts to pass a resolution condemning the invasion or authorizing collective military action against Russia (United Nations 2022), highlighting the limitations of the UN’s institutional structure. Despite the UN’s normative commitment to maintaining international peace and security (UN Charter 1945), its composition of individual states means that the P5 members like Russia can shield themselves from international condemnation or action. Furthermore, the bureaucratic inefficiencies extend to the UN’s peacekeeping missions, where slow and complex processes for deploying resources hinder timely intervention. In Ukraine’s case, despite facing an existential threat, the UN’s capacity to act was hamstrung by the need to operate within the framework of international consensus, effectively neutralized by Russia’s influence. Thus, the UN disproportionately serves the interests of powerful states, as seen in this instance with Russia.

EU’s Fragmented Response

The European Union also exhibited bureaucratic pathologies, particularly in its ability to align its member states on a unified response to the crisis. The EU’s structure requires alignment on sanctions, economic measures, and military aid, which were hampered by divergent national interests (Pertiwi 2024). Countries like Germany and Hungary, heavily dependent on Russian energy, initially resisted sanctions, with Germany sourcing 55% of its gas from Russia (Reuters 2022). Other states, France, for instance, were more concerned with diplomatic solutions and were cautious about escalating tensions with Russia (Schofield 2024). This internal fragmentation resulted in delays and diffusion in economic sanctions and a patchwork of military support (Costa and Barbé 2023), rather than a unified and swift reaction that might have acted either as a deterrent before the full-scale invasion in 2022, or a credible backing of Ukraine militarily after the invasion.

Barnett and Finnemore’s framework also helps to explain how the EU’s overload of norms, including human rights, democracy, and economic liberalism, can create contradictions that make it difficult to act decisively (1999). The diverging interests of EU countries, driven by economic, political, and security concerns, often clash with these normative commitments, leading to inconsistent actions. The EU promotes democracy and the rule of law, but hesitated to take swift action against Russia because of economic dependencies, further supported by Russian strong nuclear weapons rhetoric (Nissen and Dreyer 2024). Again, countries like Germany and Hungary, heavily reliant on Russian gas, were reluctant to impose strong sanctions that would hurt their own economies (Reuters 2022), even though this delay weakened the West’s ability to defend Ukraine and deter Russia. These contradictions in norms reflect the pathological behavior of IOs, where adherence to rules or competing interests dilutes effective action.

NATO’s Decision-Making Inability

NATO, as a collective defense alliance, faces structural limitations akin to those in the UN and EU, bound by rules and frameworks that can hinder decisive action. The requirement for consensus among all member states, while ensuring collective buy-in, often leaves NATO vulnerable to internal divisions and slower responses in crises. This consensus rule became particularly apparent during the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Although NATO swiftly reinforced its troop presence in Eastern Europe as a precaution, the lack of unanimous support among members prevented any direct intervention in Ukraine (CFR 2024), primarily due to concerns over escalating the conflict with a nuclear-armed Russia.

These internal divisions further delayed resource mobilization as member states varied in their willingness to confront Russia. Poland and the Baltic states, perceiving an imminent threat, advocated for more robust measures (Beszłej 2024), while Germany, with significant economic ties to Russia, was more cautious (Driedger 2022). This divergence in national interests led to fragmented decision-making and delays in NATO’s collective response.

Additionally, NATO’s procedural limitations meant that Ukraine, as a partner but a non-member of NATO, did not qualify for Article 5’s collective defense guarantee, leaving it outside the alliance’s direct military protection. Despite Ukraine’s requests for NATO support and eventual membership, the alliance’s reliance on procedural frameworks kept such assistance limited to indirect support (NATO 2024). Russian nuclear rhetoric further complicated the situation, providing a strong deterrent and justifying the reluctance among some NATO members to risk more direct involvement, which could escalate into a broader conflict.

Inconsistencies in Western Interventions

What most undermines the LRBWO though is not the institutional gridlock within this system, but the West’s inconsistent application of international law. As the supposed defender of the LRBWO, the West has a history of selectively invoking international law, either to justify interventions or to excuse inaction, based on its political and strategic interests (Jahn 2018: 59). This double standard leads to the ‘crisis of authority’ as it erodes the legitimacy of Western appeals to defend Ukraine using international law and the norms of the LRBWO.

For example, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was carried out without explicit UN authorization, under the justification of humanitarian intervention (Duncombe and Dunne 2018: 29). Similarly, the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was widely seen as a violation of international law, as it lacked clear UN Security Council approval (Jahn 2018: 57). These precedents allow Russia to point to Western interventions as justifications for its actions in Ukraine.

The West’s selective enforcement of norms regarding sovereignty and territorial integrity (e.g., supporting Kosovo’s independence but opposing Crimea’s annexation) gave Russia rhetorical and political leverage to justify its aggression. This undermined the West’s credibility when it sought to defend Ukraine based on international law and led to the ‘crisis of authority’ in the international system. The fact that the US and the UK signed the Budapest Memorandum, yet they allowed Russia to invade Ukraine, is another example of how the West selectively chooses which treaties to uphold and which to ignore, highlighting that even the supposed defenders of the LRBWO are willing to defend it only when it serves their interest.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the war in Ukraine represents a critical juncture, exposing deep cracks in the Liberal Rules Based World Order and raising questions about its ability to uphold its foundational principles. While gridlock in institutions like the UN, EU, and NATO has hindered decisive action, the West’s selective application of international law has, throughout the years, damaged this order’s credibility. Decades of inconsistent enforcement of international norms have eroded Western credibility, making it difficult to rally effective support for Ukraine. This double standard has not only weakened the West’s position but also provided Russia with rhetorical leverage to justify its invasion.

The structural limitations of international organizations, paralyzed by vetoes, fragmented by divergent national interests, and bound by complex procedures, show they are ill-equipped to address LRBWO violations when a powerful state like Russia acts unilaterally. This multilateral failure, compounded by economic dependencies and nuclear threats, has left Ukraine vulnerable and the West unable to uphold the principles it claims to defend.

Jahn (2018) argues that LRBWO faces a "crisis of success." As liberal values have spread, internal divisions and external opposition have grown, challenging the unity needed for cohesive, credible action. Jahn further states that for LRBWO to remain viable, it must redefine its principles, balancing domestic commitments to liberal values with the practical challenges of a multipolar world (2018: 59). Whether, through reform or adaptation, the future of the LRBWO will depend on its ability to navigate these divides and respond flexibly to shifting global dynamics.